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Torts
by Phillip Comer Griffeth*
Christopher R. Breault**
and Christopher Barwick Newbern***
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2015 and May 31, 2016.1
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

The Georgia Supreme Court, in Nguyen v. Southwestern Emergency
Physicians, P.C.,2 considered the scope and application of Georgia's socalled "ER statute." 3 In pertinent part, the ER statute requires plaintiffs
who bring medical malpractice claims concerning "emergency medical
care" in a hospital emergency department to "prove by 'clear and
convincing evidence,' rather than the usual preponderance of the
evidence, that the 'providers actions showed gross negligence,' rather
4
than the usual ordinary negligence."
The plaintiffs in Nguyen took their six-month old baby to an
emergency room after she fell off a bed and hit her head. At the hospital,
* Associate Director, Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia, Athens,
Georgia. Davidson College (B.A., 1989); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., cum laude, 1993). Member, Mercer Law Review (1991-1993); Georgia Survey Editor
(1992-1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Trial Lawyer and Jury Consultant, The Breault Law Firm, Athens, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.A., 2007); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2012).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Personal Injury Attorney, Chuck Clay & Associates, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.A., 2008); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia tort law during the prior survey period, see Phillip
Comer Griffeth, Cash V. Morris & Christopher R. Breault, Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 67 MERCER L. REV. 237 (2015).
2. 298 Ga. 75, 779 S.E.2d 334 (2015).

3. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 (Supp. 2016).
4. Nguyen, 298 Ga. at 75, 77, 779 S.E.2d at 336-37 (quoting O.C.G.A.
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a paramedic assigned the baby "priority level 4," meaning that "if no
emergency medicine is applied, this person is not going to die or suffer
serious injury."5 The baby was sent to a "non-emergency patients" area
and examined by a physician's assistant who concluded no other tests
were needed, found the baby's condition "stable," and discharged her.6
Days later, the baby stopped breathing, was taken back to the hospital,
and was diagnosed with a skull. fracture and large subdural hematoma.
Due to the hematoma, she sustained severe brain damage. Her parents
sued the hospital for medical malpractice and moved for partial summary
judgment, arguing the ER statute did not apply.7
The trial court granted the parents' motion, holding that the phrase
"emergency medical care" in the statute "requires both the provider's
belief that he was providing emergency care, and the patient's . .
symptoms manifesting a medical .

.

. condition that objectively requires

immediate medical attention."8 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
finding the evidence created a jury question on whether the child's
medical condition "triggered the ER statute.' 9 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed. 10
The supreme court noted that the ER statute defines "emergency
medical care" as "bona fide emergency services" that are "provided in an
emergency department" after "the onset of a medical .

.

. condition." 1

According to the court, bona fide emergency services establish an
"objective standard" that requires "genuine or actual emergency
services," such that a health care provider's subjective belief about the
care does not control. 12 For instance, the ER statute does not apply to flu
shots and other care that, viewed objectively, is not emergency service.' 3
By contrast, medical services commonly provided in an emergency room,
such as "evaluating, classifying, and treating patients," may be "bona fide
emergency services" even though the result of the case is "that the patient
is diagnosed as not needing .

.

. emergency treatment."14

The court explained that whether the patient's symptoms manifest a
medical condition that objectively requires immediate medical attention

5. Id. at 76, 779 S.E.2d at 336.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 77, 779 S.E.2d at 337.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

85, 779 S.E.2d at 342.
79, 779 S.E.2d at 338 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(a)(5) (Supp. 2016)).
79-80, 779 S.E.2d at 338.
80, 779 S.E.2d at 339.
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is also an objective test. 15 Under such a test, a jury must consider whether
the patient's symptoms as revealed to the medical provider were
"sufficiently severe to show that the patient had a medical or traumatic
condition that could reasonably be expected to seriously impair her
health if not attended to immediately."1 6 A health provider's subjective
belief about a patient's condition, though not controlling, is "relevant."' 7
Other relevant factors include the patient's medical history and the
circumstances of the injury, to the extent known by the provider.18
Applying these principles, the court found no dispute that the baby
received bona fide emergency services at "a hospital emergency
department." 9 Yet, the court found a jury question on whether the baby's
manifested symptoms were sufficiently severe to trigger the ER statute. 20
In reaching the latter conclusion, the court acknowledged evidence that
the baby's condition was deemed by ER personnel to be non-emergent
and not severe. 21 On the other hand, the court noted evidence that the
hospital knew that babies face an increased risk of severe injuries from
head trauma, and that the child's mother had described the child's head
injury in testimony as "a reddish-purple swelling the size of an apple."22
The court held that the contradictory evidence created a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the ER statute applied. 23
Two recent cases dealt with the expert witness competency
requirements of Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 24-

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 81, 779 S.E.2d at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 82, 779 S.E.2d at 340.
Id. at 83-84, 779 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 83, 779 S.E.2d at 340.
Id.
Id. at 85, 779 S.E.2d at 341.
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7-702(c)(2)(A) 24 in medical malpractice cases. 25 In Dubois v. Brantley,26 a
plaintiff whose pancreas was punctured during a laparoscopic procedure
to repair an umbilical hernia brought suit against his surgeon. In support
of his claim, the plaintiff offered the testimony of his expert witness, also
a practicing surgeon, who testified that no abdominal laparoscopic
procedure, if performed within the standard of care, should ever result in
a punctured pancreas. 27
The defendant-surgeon moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, claiming the plaintiffs expert was
not competent under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2)(A) to offer expert
testimony on the standard of care in the specific surgical procedure.
Specifically, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs expert was not
competent because the expert had not performed more than one
laparoscopic procedure to repair an umbilical hernia in the last five
years. The defendant argued this in spite of evidence that, during that
same time frame, the expert had performed numerous open (i.e., nonlaparoscopic) surgeries to repair umbilical hernias and numerous other
abdominal laparoscopic procedures not involving umbilical hernias. 28
The trial court denied the defendant's motion, the court of appeals
reversed, and a writ of certiorari was issued by the Georgia Supreme
Court. 29

The supreme court concluded that a careful reading of the statute does
"not require that an expert actually have performed or taught the very
procedure at issue." 30 Rather, the statute requires the expert to have
knowledge and experience in the relevant "area of practice or specialty"

24. O.C.G.A. § 27-7-702(c)(2)(A) (2013). In pertinent part, O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2)(A)
states that in a medical malpractice case, a witness rendering expert opinion testimony
regarding the applicable standard of medical care is competent to provide such testimony
only if the expert witness
[H]ad actual professional knowledge and experience in the area of practice or
specialty in which the opinion is to be given as the result of having been regularly
engaged in: (A) The active practice of such area of specialty of his or her
profession for at least three of the last five years, with sufficient frequency to
establish an appropriate level of knowledge, as determined by the judge, in
performing the procedure . . . which is alleged to have been performed or
rendered negligently.

Id.
25. See Dubois v. Brantley, 297 Ga. 575, 775 S.E.2d 512 (2015); Blake v. KES, Inc., 336
Ga. App. 43, 783 S.E.2d 432 (2016).
26. 297 Ga. 575, 775 S.E.2d 512 (2015).
27. Id. at 575, 576, 775 S.E.2d at 513, 514.
28. Id. at 576, 578, 775 S.E.2d at 514, 515.
29. Id. at 575, 578, 775 S.E.2d at 513, 515.
30. Id. at 584, 775 S.E.2d at 519.
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based on the expert having been "regularly engaged in . . . the active

practice of such area of specialty" within "at least three of the last five
years." 31 Thus, "the pertinent question" is whether an expert has an

appropriate level of knowledge, as determined by the trial judge, in
performing the procedure, rather than whether the expert himself has
actually performed it.32 Ultimately, the supreme court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion, and found under the evidence, the
"trial court properly could have concluded that [the plaintiffs expert] has
experience enough to establish a reliable basis for the opinions that he
proposes to render." 33
Similarly, Blake v. KES, Inc. 3 4 involved a defendant residential care
facility's attempt to exclude a medical doctor's opinion that the failure of
the facility staff to timely render CPR to a disabled patient likely caused
the patient's death. In Blake, the plaintiffs' adult son had been diagnosed
with developmental and mental disabilities and with partial complex
seizures. He spent most days at the facility, where he needed daily
medication and constant line-of-sight supervision due to his history of
leaving his assigned area without notice. One day, the son walked out of
the building while his caregiver was out of the room, and a security
surveillance video showed him leaning against a van and then falling to
the ground. Facility staff discovered him soon after, but there was a delay
of a few minutes before they began administering CPR. Paramedics
subsequently arrived and took the son to the hospital, but he was
pronounced dead shortly after arrival. The emergency room doctor
determined the cause of death was "cardiac arrest status post likely
seizure."36

The plaintiffs' lawsuit against the facility asserted "negligence,
negligence per se, wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional
36
distress, breach of contract, and negligent supervision and training."
The plaintiffs' expert testified that the facility failed to timely administer
CPR and, if they had done so, the son would have had "at least [a] 50
percent" chance of resuscitation.3 7 Though the trial court found this
testimony to create a material question of fact on causation, the trial
court held that the doctor was not competent under O.C.G.A. § 24-7702(c)(2)(D) because he did not "supervise, teach, or instruct medical

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 585, 775 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 588-89, 775 S.E.2d at 522.
336 Ga. App. 43, 783 S.E.2d 432 (2016).
Id. at 44-45, 783 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 45, 783 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 46, 783 S.E.2d at 434.
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support staff' for three out of five years. 8 Granting summary judgment
to the facility, the court held there was "insufficient evidence to support
the plaintiffs' claim that [the facility's] failure to promptly administer
CPR to [the plaintiffs' son] was a proximate cause of his death." 39
The court of appeals vacated. 40 Rather than evaluating the expert's
qualifications under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2)(A), the court of appeals
noted that the statute "applies only in cases of alleged medical
malpractice." 41 The court explained that a medical malpractice action
must "call[ into question the conduct of a professional in his area of
expertise," and that "not all injuries that occur in a hospital, nursing
home or other health care facility are the result of professional negligence
.. . ."42 A court "must look to the substance of an action . . . in determining
whether the action is one for professional or simple negligence."43 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims "do not allege medical
malpractice," emphasizing the facility provided "education, life skills, job
assistance, and rehabilitation services" and that its employees involved
in the incident were "nonmedical personnel." 44 Thus, the court held that
the plaintiffs were not required to establish that their expert met the
competency requirements of O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2)(A). 45

II. PREMISES LIABILITY
A. Casesfor the Plaintiff
In Hill v. Cole CC Kennesaw GA, LLC's second trip to the court of
appeals, 46 the plaintiff was again successful when summary judgmentthis time for the building owner and manager-was reversed in a claim
for "injuries . . . allegedly sustained when [the plaintiff] tripped and fell
while entering an elevator that had not stopped level with the floor." 47

38. Id. at 46, 49, 783 S.E.2d at 434, 436.
39. Id. at 45-46, 783 S.E.2d at 434.
40. Id. at 51, 783 S.E.2d at 437.
41. Id. at 49, 783 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting Wilson v. McNeely, 307 Ga. App. 876, 879, 705
S.E.2d 874, 877 (2011)).
42. Id. at 50, 783 S.E.2d at 436-37 (quoting Moore v. Louis Smith Mem. Hosp., 216 Ga.
App. 299, 299, 300, 454 S.E.2d 190, 191, 192 (1995)).
43. Id. at 50, 783 S.E.2d at 437 (quoting Moore, 216 Ga. App. at 300, 454 S.E.2d at 192).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 50-51, 783 S.E.2d at 437.
46. 334 Ga. App. 845, 780 S.E.2d 537 (2015). The first trip was discussed in last year's
Survey. See Griffeth et al., supranote 1, at 246 (discussing Hill v. Kone, Inc. (Hill 1), 329
Ga. App. 716, 766 S.E.2d 120 (2014)).
47. Hill, 334 Ga. App. at 845, 780 S.E.2d at 538.

2016]

TORTS

285

The court determined that because there was some evidence of the
elevator maintenance company's negligence, there was an issue of
material fact as to the owner and manager's vicarious liability, and it
reiterated its opinion in the first Hill case that "failure to comply with
the [elevator inspection] statute, whether intentionally or by mistake,
constituted a form of spoliation, rendering summary judgment
inappropriate." 48
The plaintiffs also succeeded in two static condition cases. For
example, in Stephens v. Kmart Corp.,49 summary judgment was reversed
when the plaintiff fell stepping off the curb of a Kmart store because,
"there were material issues of fact as to whether the curb was obstructed
by the racks and clothing on the sidewalk."5 0 The record included
testimony of the plaintiff, the store manager on duty the day of the fall,
and a corporate representative. 51 Likewise, in Gaskins v. Berry's Boat
Dock,52 the court reversed summary judgment to the property owner
when plaintiff fell "when a pipe and chain railing on a ramp to a floating
dock [at a facility on Lake Jackson] gave way." 53 The plaintiff introduced

testimony of a professional inspector who examined the railing after the
incident. 54 The court held, "the trial court erred by concluding that
Gaskins had equal knowledge of the alleged defect in the railing and by
concluding as a matter of fact and law that the pipe and chain railing was
not a handrail meant for safety purposes."55 The case turned on
constructive knowledge and whether the owner had a reasonable
inspection procedure.5 6
Summary judgment for the premises owner was also reversed in a
claim for "injuries [the plaintiff] sustained when she fell off a stage at a
conference she was attending at the Hyatt Regency in Savannah."5 7
According to the court of appeals, the plaintiff raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to Hyatt's constructive knowledge of the hazard, which
somewhat discounted the testimony of the banquet manager relied upon
48. Id. at 851, 780 S.E.2d at 542. Judge Doyle, who wrote the opinion in Hill I, and
Judge Boggs joined Judge Phipps, who wrote this opinion. Id.
49. 336 Ga. App. 332, 785 S.E.2d 21 (2016).
50. Id. at 334, 785 S.E.2d at 23. Judge Barnes wrote the opinion with Judges McMillian
and Ray on the panel. Id. at 332, 336, 785 S.E.2d at 22, 24.
51. Id. at 335-36, 785 S.E.2d at 24.
52. 334 Ga. App. 642, 780 S.E.2d 83 (2015).
53. Id. at 642, 780 S.E.2d at 84.
54. Id. at 643, 780 S.E.2d at 84.
55. Id. at 643-44, 780 S.E.2d at 85.
56. Id. at 644-45, 780 S.E.2d at 85. Judge Branch wrote the opinion, joined by Judges
Andrews and Miller. Id. at 642, 645, 780 S.E.2d at 84, 86.
57. Fitzpatrick v. Hyatt Corp., 335 Ga. App. 203, 203-04, 779 S.E.2d 110, 111 (2015).
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by the defense.5 8 The court also agreed that "whether [the plaintiff]
exercised reasonable care for her own safety [wa]s a question for jury
resolution."59 Yet another opinion from the same panel has no authority
as binding precedent.6 0 The case involved an alleged defect-a hole in a
concrete walkway- and the court found a jury question not only as to
causation, but also found that a "jury, rather than this court, should
assess the reasonableness of the landlord's inspections" and that the
61
"judgment need not be affirmed under the 'right for any reason' rule."
Judge McFadden authored the opinion, but Judge Dillard concurred in
judgment only, because, "[he] d[id] not agree with all that is said in the
62
majority opinion."
B. Cases for the Premises Owner
Three opinions from the same panel 63 resulted in rulings for the
premises owner. In Esposito v. PharrCourt Associates, L.P.,64 summary
judgment for a nursing home was affirmed when, "there was no showing
the [premises owner] had knowledge of the substance on the floor, or that
it had time to discover the substance even with the frequent lobby
inspections conducted by the receptionist." 65 The plaintiff fell while
visiting her husband, a resident of the facility.66 Interestingly, though the
Georgia Court of Appeals found a genuine issue of material fact as to the

58. Id. at 206, 779 S.E.2d at 112.
59. Id. The court distinguished Keister v. Creative Arts Guild, 139 Ga. App. 67, 227
S.E.2d 880 (1976), and Herschel McDaniel Funeral Home v. Hines, 124 Ga. App. 47, 183
S.E.2d 7 (1971). Fitzpatrick, 335 Ga. App. at 207, 779 S.E.2d at 113. Judge McFadden wrote
for the panel, joined by Judges Ellington and Dillard. Id. at 203, 207, 779 S.E.2d at 111,
113.
60. See Riggs v. Highland Hills Apartments, LLC, 334 Ga. App. 247, 779 S.E.2d 20
(2015) (reversing summary judgment for the landlord-under an invitee analysis-in a
claim related to a trip and fall in a common area at the apartment complex where the
plaintiff lived).
61. Id. at 247, 251-52, 779 S.E.2d at 22, 24-25. The court distinguished a line of cases
in which the evidence of causation was too speculative or the plaintiff was uncertain as to
the cause of the fall. See Canaan Land Props. v. Herrington, 330 Ga. App. 17, 19-20, 766
S.E.2d 493, 495 (2014) (discussed in last year's Survey, Griffeth et al., supranote 1, at 244);
Pinckney v. Covington Athletic Club & Fitness Ctr., 288 Ga. App. 891, 893, 655 S.E.2d 650,
652 (2007); Pennington v. WJL, Inc., 263 Ga. App. 758, 759-60, 589 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2003);
Moore v. Teague, 255 Ga. App. 220, 220-21, 564 S.E.2d 817, 819 (2002); Shadburn v.
Whitlow, 243 Ga. App. 555, 556, 533 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2000).
62. Riggs, 334 Ga. App. 254, 779 S.E.2d at 26 (Dillard, J., concurring).
63. Judges Andrews, Branch, and Miller.
64. 334 Ga. App. 434, 779 S.E.2d 675 (2015).
65. Id. at 438, 779 S.E.2d at 678.
66. Id. at 435, 779 S.E.2d at 676.
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plaintiffs status as licensee or invitee when she "provided much of the
daily care for her husband, which obviously lightened the burden of the
nursing home staff, and where [the defendant]'s own director of nursing
considered visitors to be customers,"6 7 summary judgment was
nevertheless appropriate.6 8 In McDonald v. West Point Food Mart, Inc.,69
the court affirmed summary judgment for the premises owner in a trip
and fall at a convenience store. 70 The plaintiff had just bought lottery
tickets (as she did nearly every day) and tripped over a case of beer while
exiting the store.7' While noting a question of fact as to whether she "was
exercising ordinary care for her own safety" and whether the store had
actual knowledge of the hazard considering hearsay testimony from the
plaintiff and store operator (introduced without objection), the court
affirmed summary judgment on the "right for any reason standard" as
the plaintiff "failed to produce evidence that the condition which caused
her injury was a foreseeable danger or hazardous condition on the
premises creating an unreasonable risk of harm." 72 Finally, an
intoxicated Georgia Tech freshman was unsuccessful in a premises suit
for an injury on the University of Georgia campus. 73 The plaintiff tripped
on an irrigation pipe set in a landscaped area and fell into a window
well. 74 The court first held that "as a matter of law, [the plaintiff] was a

licensee of the Board [of Regents] when he was injured outside of Park
Hall." 75 Further, the pipe was not a mantrap or pitfall, but rather a static

condition, and the plaintiff failed to meet the willful or wanton injury
standard. 76
Deposition testimony was key in two opinions from another panel that
also favored the premises owner. In Forest Cove Apartments, LLC v.

67. Id. at 437, 779 S.E.2d at 677.
68. Id. at 438, 779 S.E.2d at 678.
69. 332 Ga. App. 753, 774 S.E.2d 774 (2015).
70. Id. at 753, 774 S.E.2d at 775.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 753, 754, 774 S.E.2d at 775, 776. Judge Andrews wrote the opinion joined by
Judges Branch and Miller, who concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 753, 756, 774 S.E.2d
at 775, 777.
73. See Scully v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 332 Ga. App. 873, 775 S.E.2d
230 (2015).
74. Id. at 873, 775 S.E.2d at 231. The plaintiff had a blood alcohol level of .243
"consistent with consuming an estimated 16 to 17 alcoholic drinks." Id. at 875 n.4, 775
S.E.2d at 233 n.4.
75. Id. at 877, 775 S.E.2d at 234.
76. Id. at 878, 775 S.E.2d at 234. Judge Miller wrote for the panel, joined by Judges
Andrews and Branch. Id. at 873, 878, 775 S.E.2d at 231, 234.
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Wilson,77 the court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment
to the defendants in an interlocutory appeal.78 Plaintiff Wilson "fell from
an upstairs bathroom while performing independent contractor work for
the defendants at an apartment complex."79 The court held that the
"uncontroverted evidence of record shows that Wilson had equal
knowledge of the hazardous condition that led to her fall."s0 The court
also found the asset manager's deposition testimony regarding prior
subfloor incidents insufficient to create a jury issue, as there was no
showing of substantial similarity of the conditions.8 1 However, the lack
of deposition testimony can also make a difference. For example, in
Barbour-Amir v. Comcast of Georgia/Virginia, Inc. 82 the record
contained deposition testimony of the plaintiff, the customer service
representative who assisted her, the store security guard, and a store
officer who did an internal investigation,8 but "[d]epositions were not
taken of any of the other customer service representatives who had been
on duty or of any other customers who had been in the store." 84 Summary
judgment for the premises owner was affirmed when the plaintiff tripped
over a child who was sitting on the floor behind her in a store because
there was no "actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard posed by
the child" on the part of the owner. 85

77. 333 Ga. App. 731, 776 S.E.2d 664 (2015).
78. Id. at 731, 776 S.E.2d at 666.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 734, 776 S.E.2d at 668. The court relied in part upon Houston v. Wal-Mart
Stores E., L.P., 324 Ga. App. 105, 749 S.E.2d 400 (2013) (discussed in Phillip Comer Griffeth
& Cash V. Morris, Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 66 MERCER L. REV. 189, 206
(2014)). Forest Cove, 333 Ga. App. at 734, 776 S.E.2d at 668.
81. Forest Cove, 333 Ga. App. at 736, 776 S.E.2d at 669. Judge Barnes wrote for the
panel, joined by Judges Ray and McMillian. Id. at 731, 738, 776 S.E.2d at 666, 670. In the
footnotes, the court noted that, under the rule in Prophecy Corp. v. CharlesRossignol, Inc,
256 Ga. 27, 28, 343 S.E.2d 680, 681 (1986), the plaintiffs contradictory deposition testimony
was construed against her in setting forth the factual background. Id. at 733 nn.1-2, 776
S.E.2d at 667 nn.1-2.
82. 332 Ga. App. 279, 772 S.E.2d 231 (2015).
83. Id. at 282, 772 S.E.2d at 234.
84. Id. at 280-81, 772 S.E.2d at 233.
85. Id. at 279, 772 S.E.2d at 232. The court relied in part upon Ingles Markets, Inc. v.
Carroll, 329 Ga. App. 365, 765 S.E.2d 45 (2014) (discussed in Griffeth et al., supra note 1,
at 242), and Benefield v. Tominich, 308 Ga. App. 605, 708 S.E.2d 563 (2011) (discussed in
Phillip Comer Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER
L. REV. 343, 350 (2011)). Barbour-Amir, 332 Ga. App. at 283, 772 S.E.2d at 235. Judge
Barnes wrote the opinion, joined by Judges Ray and McMillian. Id. at 279, 284, 772 S.E.2d
at 232, 235.
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C. Cases of the Whole Court

'

In its second appearance before the court of appeals, and in this
Survey, 86 the full court in Six Flags Over Georgia, IIL.P. v. Martin87 held
that while "the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict [for
the plaintiff]," the verdict must be reversed "because the trial court erred
in denying Six Flags's apportionment request."8 8 The court first
disagreed with the defense's assertion that "the bus stop where Martin
was attacked was not, as a matter of law, part of its 'premises and
approaches' within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1"89 and also that
"the evidence was insufficient to prove causation." 90 However, because
the trial court failed to allow the defense to include two individuals who
''were present and may have been involved in the attack" on the verdict
form, the verdict was reversed.9
Judge Miller filed a special concurrence, joined by Judges McFadden
and McMillian, in which she indicated that a retrial on liability was not
necessary, only a retrial as to damages and apportionment. 92 Judges
Ellington and Phipps concurred in the judgment only.9 3 Judge Andrews
filed a lengthy dissent, joined by Judge Doyle, asserting that:
Six Flags was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on [the] premises
liability claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 seeking to hold Six Flags liable
for injuries Martin suffered in a third-party criminal attack on public
property which was not part of the Six Flags premises or approaches. 94
The dissenting judges were not convinced that "the attack occurred on an
approach to the park on which Six Flags had a right to provide
security." 95
In another opinion authored by Judge Branch, the court considered
and affirmed summary judgment for the premises owner, a Savannah

86. See Phillip Comer Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
65 MERCER L. REV. 265, 275 n.93 (2013).
87. 335 Ga. App. 350, 780 S.E.2d 796 (2015).
88. Id. at 350, 780 S.E.2d at 799.
89. Id. at 352, 780 S.E.2d at 801.
90. Id. at 360, 780 S.E.2d at 801.
91. Id. at 364, 367, 780 S.E.2d at 808, 810. Judge Dillard authored the opinion, joined
by Judges Barnes, Boggs, Ray, and Branch, who concurred. Id. at 350, 367, 780 S.E.2d at
799, 811.
92. Id. at 368, 780 S.E.2d at 811 (Miller, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 367, 780 S.E.2d at 811.
94. Id. at 370, 780 S.E.2d at 812 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 378, 780 S.E.2d at 818.
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restaurant. 96 The -plaintifffell "from a platform upon exiting a toilet stall
in the women's restroom." 97 But because "she had previously negotiated
the platform when she entered the toilet stall," 98 the court held she had
equal knowledge of the hazard to that of the owner.99 The majority relied
on prior case law concerning a "second approach to a static hazard soon
after successful traversal of the same hazard." 00
Judge Barnes wrote the dissent, joined by Presiding Judge
Ellington.101 As in a similar dissent discussed in last year's Survey, 102
Judge Barnes cited Robinson v. Kroger Co.103 to close: "Summary
judgment is proper 'only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and
undisputed,' and that simply is not the situation here." 10 4 The dissent
cited testimony of a professional engineer hired by the plaintiff as to
"multiple building code violations" as well as a "second expert, a professor
of psychology who specialized in the study of human perception and
performance."1 05 The dissent's analysis turned on whether the static
06
condition was "readily discernible."1
III. APPORTIONMENT

In two recent cases, the Georgia Supreme Court resolved the ongoing
question that has been raging since the inception of the Georgia
Apportionment Statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33: Does the statute require a
trier of fact to consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the
alleged injury or damages, whether or not such persons can potentially
be held liable to the plaintiff in tort?
In Zaldivar v. Prickett,0 7 the plaintiff was driving his employer's
vehicle when it collided with a vehicle driven by the defendant, and the
plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The defendant filed a notice
of nonparty fault, claiming the plaintiffs employer had negligently

96. Norwich v. The Shrimp Factory Inc., 332 Ga. App. 159, 159-60, 770 S.E.2d 357,
357-58 (2015).
97. Id. at 159, 770 S.E.2d at 357.
98. Id. at 160, 770 S.E.2d at 357-58.
99. Id. at 164, 770 S.E.2d at 361.
100. Id. at 162, 770 S.E.2d at 359.
101. Id. at 165, 770 S.E.2d at 361.
102. See Griffeth et al., supra note 1, at 243-44.
103. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
104. Norwich, 332 Ga. App. at 170, 770 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting Robinson, 268 Ga. at 748,
493 S.E.2d at 414).
105. Id. at 165-66, 770 S.E.2d at 361.
106. Id. at 168-69, 770 S.E.2d at 363.
107. 297 Ga. 589, 774 S.E.2d 688 (2015).
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entrusted the vehicle to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on the nonparty fault defense. 08 Granting
the motion, the trial court found that the employer's negligent
entrustment "could not possibly have been a proximate cause of any
injuries [the plaintiff] sustained."10 9 In a split decision, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.1 10
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the judgment, finding
apportionment of fault to the plaintiffs employer permissible under
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.111 The court first evaluated the meaning of the term
"fault" as it is used throughout the statute. 112 The court found the word
"fault" is:
[M]ost naturally and reasonably understood to require the trier of fact
to consider any breach of a legal duty that sounds in tort for the
protection of the plaintiff, the breach of which is a proximate cause of
the injury about which he complains, whether that breach is
attributable to the plaintiff himself, a defendant with liability, or
another.1 13
In other words, the court agreed that, under the statute, a jury can
attribute fault to a nonparty only when the nonparty is shown to have
committed a tort against the plaintiff that was a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injury.114
However, the court further held that allocation of fault to a nonparty
does not depend on whether such nonparty could be potentially liable to
the plaintiff.1 15 The court focused on O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c) 116 and
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d)(1),117 concluding that these provisions, viewed
together, show that the statute contemplates the consideration of a
nonparty's fault "regardless of their liability or potential liability to the

108. Id. at 589-90, 774 S.E.2d at 690-91.
109. Id. at 590, 774 S.E.2d at 691.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 591, 774 S.E.2d at 691; O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2000 & Supp. 2016).
112. Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 591-96, 774 S.E.2d at 691-94.
113. Id. at 596, 774 S.E.2d at 694.
114. Id. at 591, 774 S.E.2d at 691.
115. Id. at 600, 774 S.E.2d at 697.
116. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c) requires the jury to allocate fault to all entities that
"contributed" to the plaintiffs injury "regardless of whether the person or entity was, or
could have been, named as a party to the suit." O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c) (2000 & Supp. 2016).
117. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d)(1) states, inter alia, that the fault of a nonparty may be
considered even if the "the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the
nonparty." O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d)(1) (Supp. 2016).
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plaintiff in tort." 118 The court explained: "Although .

.

. a defense or

immunity may cut off liability, a tortfeasor is still a tortfeasor, and
nothing about his defense or immunity means that he cannot be said to
have committed a tort that was a proximate cause of the injury to the
plaintiff."119
Finally, the court held that negligent entrustment could potentially be
a proximate cause of injury to the person entrusted.1 20 The court
acknowledged the plaintiffs own negligence might prevent liability
against the employer due to the doctrine of comparative negligence, and
the plaintiffs employer might be immune from liability to the plaintiff
under the Workers' Compensation Act.1 21 Nevertheless, the court
reaffirmed that "an affirmative defense or immunity does not eliminate
'fault' or cut off proximate cause, it only bars liability notwithstanding
that the 'fault' of the tortfeasor was a proximate cause of the injury in
question."1 22
Notably, the Zalvidar decision was reaffirmed by the supreme court a
short time later in Walker v. Tensor Machinery, Ltd., 123 a products
liability case wherein the defendant manufacturer sought to apportion
fault to the plaintiffs nonparty employer, who was immune from liability
under the Workers' Compensation Act. The plaintiff asserted three main
arguments against apportionment. 124 First, the plaintiff argued that
apportionment would "upset the careful balance .

.

. in the Act between

the respective interests of employers and employees."1 25 Second, the
plaintiff argued that apportionment would "eviscerate the role that
subrogation plays in the workers' compensation system." 126 Third, the
plaintiff argued that apportionment would "expose employers to new and
substantial litigation costs" to which they "previously were shielded by
virtue of their immunity." 127 The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiffs arguments and found that apportionment to the employer was
permissible. 128

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 597, 774 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 597-98, 774 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 604, 774 S.E.2d at 699.
Id. See also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b) (2008).
Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 604, 774 S.E.2d at 699.
298 Ga. 297, 779 S.E.2d 651 (2015).
Id. at 297-98, 779 S.E.2d at 652-53.
Id. at 300, 779 S.E.2d at 654.
Id. at 301, 779 S.E.2d at 655.
Id. at 302, 779 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 304, 779 S.E.2d at 656.
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As to the balance of employer and employee interests under the
Workers' Compensation Act, the court noted that employer immunity
was a "quid pro quo for workers receiving the guarantee of prompt
benefits for work-related injuries without regard to fault or common-law
defenses." 129 The court found apportionment would "not disturb this quid
pro quo relationship." 130 The court explained that, although
apportionment might "diminish[] the injured party's ultimate recovery in
the tort action, the injured party has already obtained or may, post
verdict, seek recovery under the compensation law from his employer." 131
On the issue of subrogation, the court acknowledged that an
employer's "right of subrogation may be further limited . . . by an

allocation of fault to a nonparty employer," given that such allocation
would reduce the amount the plaintiff recovers in tort, and thus
potentially prevent a subrogation claim. 132 However, the court found
"nothing . .. inequitable" about such a result: "[a]fter all, the idea that an
employer should bear some cost . .. for its own fault-as opposed to that
cost being borne by another tortfeasor-is not an inherently unfair
one."

1 33

Finally, the court rejected the notion that allocation of fault to an
immune employer would significantly affect the employer's litigation
costs. 13 4 The court emphasized that the employer remains free from
having to defend tort litigation and remains immune from tort liability. 135
Further, an employer is already subject to nonparty discovery, such that
"[t]he allocation of fault to nonparty employers simply adds one
additional subject about which employers may be subject to nonparty
discovery." 136 In sum, the court held that fault may be properly
apportioned to a nonparty employer the same as any other tortfeasor who
"may have a meritorious affirmative defense or claim of immunity
against any liability to the plaintiff." 137

129.
S.E.2d
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 300, 779 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Doss v. Food Lion, 267 Ga. 312, 313, 477
577, 578 (1996)).
Id. (quoting Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 33 A.3d 1139, 1147 (N.H. 2011)).
Id. (quoting Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett, 841 So. 2d 1107, 1115 (Miss. 2003)).
Id. at 302, 779 S.E.2d at 655.
Id.
Id. at 302-03, 779 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 303, 779 S.E.2d at 656.
Id.
Id. at 304, 779 S.E.2d at 656 (quoting Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 598, 774 S.E.2d at 695).

294

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

IV. ANIMAL LIABILITY
A dog owner's liability for injury caused by his or her dog depends on
whether the owner was on notice of the dog's propensity to act in the
manner that causes injury. In three recent cases, the Georgia Court of
Appeals provided additional clarity regarding the types of facts which
may support a jury question on the issue of notice.
In Swanson v. Tackling,138 a Great Dane bit a seven-year old boy at
the defendants' home. A day earlier, the defendants had introduced the
boy to their dog which was gated off in another room. The dog put his
head over the gate and barked directly into the boy's face. The next
morning, the defendants took the boy to a store and purchased stuffed
bunnies for the dog and returned home. When the boy asked if he could
give the Great Dane a stuffed bunny, the defendants let the dog into the
room. It approached the boy and attempted to retrieve the bunny, but bit
the boy's arm. When the boy began to cry and bent his head down, the

dog also bit him on the head. 39
The boy's mother sued, and the defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing there was no evidence that the dog displayed a
propensity to bite before the incident. The trial court denied the
defendants' motion, and, on appeal, the court of appeals reversed.1 40
The court explained that, in a dog bite case, "a plaintiff can recover
based on a dangerous-animal-liability theory under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 or
a premises-liability theory under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1."141 Regardless of the
theory applied, "a plaintiff must produce evidence of the vicious
propensity of the dog." 142 "[T]o infer the requisite knowledge[,] there must
be at least one incident that would cause a prudent person to anticipate
the actual incident that caused the injury."1 43 However, "a dog's
menacing behavior alone does not demonstrate its vicious propensity or
44
place its owner on notice of such propensity."1
Under these guidelines, the court found "no evidence whatsoever of a
prior incident in which [the dog] exhibited behavior even remotely
similar to biting, attacking, or otherwise injuring a person."1 45 Although

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
S.E.2d
143.
144.
561).
145.

335 Ga. App. 810, 783 S.E.2d 167 (2016).
Id. at 810-11, 783 S.E.2d at 168.
Id. at 811, 815, 783 S.E.2d at 168-69, 172.
Id. at 812, 783 S.E.2d at 169.
Id. (quoting Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray, 316 Ga. App. 193, 195, 728
822, 825 (2012)).
Id. (quoting Stennette v. Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425, 428, 729 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2016)).
Id. at 813, 783 S.E.2d at 170 (quoting Stennette, 316 Ga. App. at 429, 729 S.E.2d at
Id.
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the dog barked in the boy's face the day before, the court found such
behavior was insufficient to put the defendants on notice of an attack. 146
Further, the court noted, although a person may be liable when he
voluntarily undertakes to restrain his dog but fails to do so, here, there
was no evidence that the defendants made any promises that the dog
would be restrained.1 47
Similarly, in Steagald v. Eason,148 the neighbor of a pit bull owner sued
the owner and his parents after the neighbor was attacked at the owner's
parents' home. A week before the attack, the owner moved into his
parents' home with his pet pit bull. The day of the move-in, the neighbor's
husband went by the home and spoke with the owner's mother, who told
the neighbor's husband that the pit bull had snapped at her that morning
when she went to feed it. That same day, the neighbor's husband went to
see the pit bull and extended his fingers toward it, and the pit bull
growled, barked, and snapped at him. Then, a week later, the neighbor
went to the home to borrow tea. The owner was in the backyard with the
pit bull and opened the gate. The neighbor walked through the gate and
extended her hand to allow the pit bull to smell her, and the pit bull
attacked, biting her on the forearm and leg. 149
After suit was filed, the dog owner and his parents moved for summary
judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. 150 The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment, 15 1 holding that the pit bull's prior snapping
behavior "was merely menacing behavior that 'alone is not sufficient to
place its owner on notice of a propensity to bite."1

52

The court focused on

the testimony of the neighbor's husband, who acknowledged that
3
snapping was common dog behavior in an unfamiliar location.15 The
court concluded "that, as a matter of law, the first-day snapping incidents
launch an
did not put the [owner] 'on notice that the dog would
54
unprovoked attack on a stranger coming into the yard."'1

146. Id.
147. Id. at 814-15, 783 S.E.2d at 171.
148. 334 Ga. App. 113, 778 S.E.2d 366 (2015) (cert. granted, Steagald v. Eason, 2016 Ga.
LEXIS 364 (May 9, 2016)).
149. Id. at 113-14, 778 S.E.2d at 367-68.
150. Id. at 113, 778 S.E.2d at 367.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 115, 778 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting Wade v. Am. Nat'1 Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458,
460, 540 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2000)).
153. Id. at 114-15, 778 S.E.2d at 368.
154. Id. at 115, 778 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting Rowlette v. Paul, 219 Ga. App. 597, 599, 466
S.E.2d 37, 39 (1995)).
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Notably, the opposite result was reached in Green v. Wilson.155 In that
case, the plaintiff worked as a housecleaner at the defendants' home. The
defendants owned a border collie. On prior occasions when cleaners came
to the home, the cleaners waited outside while the defendants secured
the border collie in a room. When the defendants moved the dog to other
rooms, it would lunge, bark, and growl at the cleaners. On the day of the
incident, the plaintiff and a coworker arrived at the defendants' home in
a company van, and the border collie was in an outdoor, fenced-in
enclosure. As the plaintiff exited the van, the border collie jumped the
fence and ran toward the plaintiff, who quickly jumped back in the van.
In the process of jumping into the van, the plaintiff sustained serious
injuries to her arm that required surgery. 156
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendants, alleging the
defendants knew of the dog's "propensity to 'chase people, or to act
aggressively toward people so as to frighten them."'15 7 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendant-homeowner, finding .no
evidence that the dog had shown a propensity to chase anyone, inside or
outside the home.158 On appeal, the court reversed, finding that the trial
court "considered the evidence .

.

. too narrowly."159 The court explained:

While a dog owner must have reason to know of [the animal's]
propensity to do harm of the type which it inflicts[,] this does not mean

an incident involving the exact same conduct and the exact same
injury must actually occur before the owner's knowledge may be
inferred, as long as there is an incident or incidents which would put
a prudent man on notice to anticipate the event which occurred. 160

The court pointed to evidence that the dog "lunged at the
housecleaners as [the defendant] held the dog back," and found there was
"no meaningful distinction between this behavior and what happened on
the day [the plaintiff] was injured."161 The court concluded that the
evidence "raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a prudent
person would anticipate that [the dog] would chase someone if
unrestrained."1 62

155. 333 Ga. App. 631, 773 S.E.2d 872 (2015).
156. Id. at 632, 773 S.E.2d at 873.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 633, 773 S.E.2d at 873.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Torrance v. Brenan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 67-68, 432 S.E.2d 658, 660 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
161. Id. at 633, 773 S.E.2d at 873-74.
162. Id. at 633, 773 S.E.2d at 874.
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V. VENUE

In Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Jordan, 163
the Georgia Court of Appeals took an expansive view of the venue
provisions of O.C.G.A § 50-21-28164 under the Georgia Tort Claims Act.
In Jordan, the parents of two children brought a medical malpractice suit
against various state entities relating to surgical procedures performed
at Children's Hospital of Georgia, located in Richmond County. After the
surgeries, the children had to be transferred to a medical facility in
Dekalb County for corrective surgeries and hospitalization.
Consequently, the parents filed the malpractice suit in Dekalb County on
the grounds that a substantial portion of the losses occurred there. The
state entity defendants filed a motion to transfer the case to Richmond
County. The trial court denied that motion, but it granted an
interlocutory appeal. 165

To resolve the dispute, the Georgia Court of Appeals looked to the
plain terms of the mandatory venue statute in the Georgia Tort Claims
Act, which provides that "[a]ll tort actions against the state under this
article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county
wherein the loss occurred."166 The court noted that the term "loss" is
defined under the Act, inter alia, as "economic loss to the person who
suffered the injury," "pain and suffering," and "any other element of
actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence."16 7 The court
emphasized if the legislature had intended to limit venue to the county
where the negligent act occurred, the legislature could have done so. 168
Because the legislature did not, the court concluded "that the legislature
intended to allow a tort action to be brought against the State in the
county where economic loss, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and
other elements of actual damages occurred."16 9 Ultimately, since it was
undisputed that the plaintiffs incurred economic and other losses in
Dekalb County, the court held that venue was proper in Dekalb
County.170

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

335 Ga. App. 703, 782 S.E.2d 809 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 (2013).
Jordan, 335 Ga. App. at 703, 782 S.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 703-04, 782 S.E.2d at 810 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28).
Id. at 704, 782 S.E.2d at 811 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(3) (2013)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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OF MEDICAL BILLS

In Bowden v. Medical Center, Inc.,171 a case involving a dispute over
medical bills that gave rise to a hospital lien, the Georgia Supreme Court
considered the discoverability of information and records relating to
amounts the hospital charged prior patients for similar treatment. The
defendant-hospital in Bowden rendered emergency care to a patient who
did not have health insurance after the patient was injured as a
passenger in a rental car involved in a collision, and the hospital billed
the patient $21,409.59 for such treatment. The patient then sued the
rental car company, and the hospital filed a hospital lien for

$21,409.59.172
The rental car company offered to settle the claim for its policy limit,
but the patient rejected the offer because she and the hospital were
unable to agree on how much of the settlement would be allocated to
release the hospital lien. In response, the rental car company filed a
complaint in interpleader against the patient and the hospital, and paid
its policy limit into the registry of the court. With her answer to the
complaint in interpleader, the patient filed a crossclaim against the
hospital to invalidate its hospital lien, alleging that her bill was grossly
excessive and did not reflect the reasonable value of her treatment. 173
During discovery, the patient served written requests on the hospital
for information and records regarding the amounts the hospital
previously charged for similar treatments, such as the hospital's pricing
agreements with health insurance companies and other materials
related to the hospital's charges of insured and uninsured patients. The
hospital objected to the discovery, and the patient filed a motion to
compel, which was granted by the trial court. 174 On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed, finding the requested records and information to be
irrelevant to the patient's claim. 75
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, finding the
patient's discovery requests to be proper, reversed the court of appeals. 176
In support, the court cited the statutory rule that parties in Georgia may
obtain discovery on "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action." 77 The court explained
that this phrase "has been construed broadly to encompass any matter
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

297 Ga. 285, 773 S.E.2d 692 (2015).
Id. at 285, 773 S.E.2d at 692-93.
Id.
Id. at 289, 773 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 290, 773 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 290, 296, 773 S.E.2d at 695, 699.
Id. at 290, 773 S.E.2d at 695 (quoting O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-26(b)(1)

(2015)).
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that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could
bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case."178 The court further
explained that information and records are discoverable without regard
to their admissibility, so long as they appear reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 179
Accordingly, the court concluded that, although the amounts the
hospital had charged to other patients for the same type of care may not
be dispositive of whether the hospital's charges in the instant case were
"reasonable," that does not mean that the amounts the hospital charged
those other patients were "entirely irrelevant-particularly in the broad
discovery sense-to the reasonableness of the charges for [this patient's]
care."

80

VII.CONCLUSION
This survey period saw the Georgia Supreme Court weigh in on key
issues in the medical malpractice area, which included the applicability
of the ER statute, qualification of expert witnesses, the discoverability of
medical billing information, and two key apportionment cases. The entire
court of appeals weighed in with two decisions that went against the
plaintiffs, one of which hinged on an apportionment request by the
defense. While last year's Survey noted the potential impact of the
expanded Georgia Court of Appeals, 181 perhaps the bigger question for
next year will be the impact of the newly expanded Supreme Court of
Georgia, which will see the appointment of new justices with 2016
legislation, and the announcement by Chief Justice Thompson of his
retirement.182

178. Id. at 291, 773 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 351 (1978)).
179. Id. at 290, 773 S.E.2d at 695-96.
180. Id. at 292, 773 S.E.2d at 696-97.
181. See Griffeth et al., supra note 1, at 255-56.

182. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Door Opens for Governor to Shape Georgia's High Court,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July 21, 2016, http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=
1202763243623/Door-Opens-for-Governor-to-Shape-Georgias-High-Court.
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